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A B S T R A C T
In this paper, we estimate a factor augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) model to investigate the effect
of oil price shocks on total private job ﬂows as well as on industry-level job creation and destruction.
Following an unexpected oil price drop in the ﬁrst year, we ﬁnd that in oil and gas extraction and support
activities for mining exhibit a reduction in job creation and an increase in job destruction. Instead, industries
in construction, manufacturing and services exhibit an increase in the net employment change. An unex-
pected decline in the real oil price slows down the pace of gross job reallocation. We demonstrate that the
increase (decrease) in private job destruction (creation) observed during the ﬁrst year is primarily driven by
the response of closing (expanding) ﬁrms in services and manufacturing.
© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In April of 2015 the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reported that
U.S. employment growth in 2014 had been concentrated in mining,
especially in the oil and gas industries. These gains in employment
were attributed to increased production due to improved technolo-
gies that allowed the U.S. to extract oil from formations with very
low permeability such as shale (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015).
Yet, with both Brent and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) prices were
experiencing large declines since July of 2014,1 the question that
arises is where do jobs go when oil prices drop?
Some journalists and stock market commentators have argued
that “the U.S. economy and stock market as a whole won’t even
notice” the decline in oil prices (Ro, 2014). They would argue
that even though the energy sector’s share in U.S. investment has
increased signiﬁcantly since the shale boom (e.g., the oil and gas
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: amherrera@uky.edu (A.M. Herrera), mkaraki@lau.edu.lb
(M.B. Karaki), srangaraju@weber.edu (S.K. Rangaraju).
1 See Baumeister and Kilian (2015) for an excellent analysis on the sources of this
decline in oil prices.
sector accounted for about 31% of capital expenditures of Compustat
ﬁrms in 2014), energy represents only a small fraction of aggregate
GDP (e.g., gas and oil extraction accounted for about 1.3% of GDP in
2014). Nevertheless, as we will show, oil price shocks exert a dispro-
portionate effect not only on job ﬂow in the energy sector but also in
manufacturing and services. Indeed, lower oil prices are good news
for sectors that use energy intensively in production or consumption.
This paper employs data on U.S. job ﬂows to investigate the
effect of unexpected oil price decreases on the labor market. We
build on the work of Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) and Herrera and
Karaki (2015) who explore the effect of oil price shocks on job real-
location, motivated by the theoretical analysis in Hamilton (1988).
Although, these papers underscore the need to use disaggregated
data in order to better understand the allocative effect of oil price
shocks, their sample only covers the manufacturing sector. More-
over, the period spanned by their data extends only to the 1990s.
Here we use a sample of eighty seven 3-digit NAICS sectors that com-
prise industries in agriculture, mining, construction, manufacturing,
and services. The series are quarterly and cover the period between
1992:Q2 and 2014:Q4. Our paper differs from previous studies in
four dimensions. First, previous investigations into the effect of oil
price shocks on labor markets have focused on aggregate employ-
ment, sectoral employment, or have used only disaggregated data for
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2016.02.006
0140-9883/© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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U.S. manufacturing.2 Hence, these studies have largely ignored the
impact on labor ﬂows in the services and mining. Given the secular
increase in the share of employment accounted for by services, the
fast expansion of U.S. shale oil production since 2013 (see, Kilian
(in press)), and the role that both oil and gas industries have played
in generating jobs after the Great Recession, it is important to include
these sectors in any analysis aimed at understanding the response of
job ﬂows to oil price shocks. Second, we re-examine the degree of
job reallocation generated by oil price shocks using sectoral job cre-
ation and destruction data that extend beyond the 1990s. Exploiting
disaggregated data on job ﬂows for this period is important given
that both labor and crude oil markets have experienced important
changes. In particular, recent work by Davis and Haltiwanger (2014)
reveals a decrease in the ﬂuidity of U.S. labormarkets since the 1990s
and work by Kilian (2009) uncovers a greater role for demand shocks
in driving real oil prices. Third, the methodology employed here dif-
fers from previous studies. Both Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) and
Herrera and Karaki (2015) estimate vector autoregressive models
where oil prices can have a nonlinear effect on job ﬂows. Here, moti-
vated by the lack of evidence in favor of asymmetry (see Herrera
and Karaki (2015)), we restrict the effect of oil prices to be linear.
Finally, we investigate whether the response of job reallocation to oil
price shock stems from the impact on expanding/contracting ﬁrms
or entering/exiting ﬁrms. This question has not been addressed by
previous studies.
We estimate the effect of an unexpected decline in the real price
of oil using a factor augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR)model.
We thus posit that job creation and destruction ﬂows in the U.S.
private sector depend both on a set of aggregate variables and on
some unobserved common industry factors, which are derived from
the industry level data on job creation and destruction rates. We
ﬁnd signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the magnitude of the job creation
and destruction responses across industries. One year after the unex-
pected oil price decrease, the cumulative change in job creation
ranges from −0.744 percentage points in other information services
to 0.965 percentage points in scenic and sightseeing transportation,
whereas the corresponding change in job destruction ranges from
−0.478 percentage points in scenic and sightseeing transportation
to 0.820 percentage points in funds, trusts and other ﬁnancial vari-
ables. On the one hand, oil and gas extraction and support activities
for mining exhibit a decrease of 0.175 and 0.919 percentage points
in the rate of change in net employment during the ﬁrst year follow-
ing an unexpected oil price decline. On the other hand, construction,
manufacturing and services respond to the decline in oil prices by
expanding employment via higher job creation (e.g. the cumulative
one-year changes for construction of buildings, wood manufacturing
and funds, trusts and other ﬁnancial vehicles equal 0.128, 0.100, and
0.761 percentage points, respectively) and by slightly lowering job
destruction. In particular, industries that are more energy intensive
in production experience larger job gains. As a result, the pace of
job reallocation, measured by excess job reallocation, declines by
0.162 percentage points in the private sector. This result is consistent
with Herrera and Karaki (2015) who – using and earlier sample –
ﬁnd that job reallocation increases in manufacturing after a positive
oil price innovation, especially in transportation equipment, textiles,
petroleum and coal, and rubber and plastics. Yet, this paper reveals
that the positive relationship between oil price changes and job
reallocation extends beyond manufacturing. Furthermore, we ﬁnd
evidence that during this period of lower job market ﬂuidity and
higher domestic oil production, employment in the private sector
declines a year after an unexpected drop in oil prices but it recovers
by the second year.
2 See for instance Kilian and Vigfusson (2011), Davis and Haltiwanger (2001),
Herrera and Karaki (2015).
Next we proceed to investigate whether the bulk of the adjust-
ment is made by existing or entering/exiting ﬁrms. To do so we
modify our FAVAR by separating the industry level data into the
job creation generated by opening and expanding ﬁrms and the job
destruction stemming from closing and contracting ﬁrms. Estimates
of this modiﬁed FAVAR reveal interesting dynamics. Focusing on
total private sector, the one year cumulative change in net employ-
ment is −0.183 percentage points. Yet two years after the shock, the
cumulative change in net employment is 0.058 percentage points.
The short-run effects on private net employment are mainly driven
by the response of expanding and closing ﬁrms in services and man-
ufacturing. Yet, as time goes by, entering ﬁrms in all sectors generate
more jobs and less jobs are destroyed by exiting establishments.
Finally, we investigate what proportion of the historical varia-
tion in the job creation and destruction rates is accounted by oil
price shocks during the shale oil boom. We ﬁnd that of the 0.5 per-
centage points of cumulative increase in net employment growth
between 2004:I and 2014:IV, 0.08 percentage points are attributed
to oil price shocks. Thus, oil price shocks accounted only for a small
proportion of the cumulative change in the net employment. This
ﬁnding is robust to splitting the sample in the period of the rapid
shale oil expansion (2004:I–2014:II) and the collapse of oil prices
(2014:II–2014:IV).
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 describes
the data used in the empirical analysis. The following section
presents the empirical strategy. The dynamic response for total and
industry level job ﬂows is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 askswhich
establishments, expanding/contracting or opening/closing, are most
affected by a decline in oil prices. In Section 6 we investigate the role
of oil price shocks in explaining the historical changes in net employ-
ment during the shale oil boom. We set forth our main conclusions
in Section 7.
2. Data
The aggregate data comprise the log growth of the real oil price,
the interest rate quality spread, and the total job creation and job
destruction rates for the private sector (hereafter total job creation
and total job destruction) computed as follows. The real oil price is
calculated by deﬂating the imported U.S. crude oil reﬁners acquisi-
tion cost reported by the Energy Information Agency by the U.S. con-
sumer price index (CPI). The interest rate quality spread – hereafter
spread – is measured as the difference between the 3-month com-
mercial paper rate and the Treasury bill rate. The 3-month com-
mercial paper rate and the Treasury bill rate are obtained from the
Federal Reserve Economic data (FRED) of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Saint Louis. Including the spread in the aggregate block allows
us to control for changes in credit conditions over the period under
analysis.
Job creation and job destruction rates are obtained from the
Business Employment Dynamics (BED) of the BLS. We employ data
on these job ﬂows for the total private sector and 87 three-digit
NAICS industries including agriculture, mining, construction, manu-
facturing, and services. The job creation rate (POSi,t) in industry i at
time t is given by
POSi,t = POSexp anding,i,t + POSopening,i,t , (1)
where POSexpanding,i,t stands for the job creation rate from expanding
establishments and POSopening,i,t refers to the job creation rate from
opening establishments. Similarly, the job destruction rate in indus-
try i at time t is deﬁned as
NEGi,t = NEGcontracting,i,t + NEGclosing,i,t , (2)
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where NEGcontracting,i,t refers to the job destruction rate from
contracting establishments and NEGclosing,i,t stands from gross job
destruction rate for closing establishments.
Following Davis et al. (1998) we compute the net change in jobs
in industry i between quarter t − 1 and t as
NETi,t = POSi,t − NEGi,t; (3)
the gross job reallocation as
SUMi,t = POSi,t + NEGi,t; (4)
and excess job reallocation as
EXCi,t = SUMi,t −
∣∣NETi,t∣∣ . (5)
Note thatwhereasNET allows us to capture the change in employ-
ment experienced by one sector, both SUM and EXC, enable us
to track the reallocation effect triggered by oil price innovations.
Moreover, because EXC quantiﬁes the reallocation activity that
exceeds what is needed to satisfy the net employment change, it is
arguably a better measure of labor market ﬂexibility (see Bauer and
Lee, 2007; Cuñat and Melitz, 2012; Micco and Carmen, 2004).
Tables 1a and 1b show the average quarterly job ﬂows for the
total private sector and the 3-digit NAICS industries computed over
our sample. There is signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the magnitude
of job ﬂows across industries. As expected, industries with higher
job creation and job destruction rates tend to exhibit higher gross
and excess job reallocation. Interestingly, for the majority of indus-
tries, the variation in job creation (destruction) is mainly driven by
changes in the ﬂows of expanding (contracting) establishments and
not of opening and closing ﬁrms. These numbers put in evidence that
adjustment by continuing ﬁrms and not by entry/exit constitutes the
bulk of the job ﬂows in the private sector.
Fig. 1 plots the percentage change in the real price of oil and
U.S. job ﬂows over time. The ﬁgure also reports the average share
of private employment accounted for by each of the represented
industries. As other researchers have noted (see e.g., Davis and
Haltiwanger, 2014) a secular decline in job ﬂows is noticeable since
the 1990s. In addition, an increase in gross job reallocation and a
decline in excess job reallocation are observable during the global
ﬁnancial crisis for the private sector and many of the depicted indus-
tries. These developments coincide with the collapse of oil prices
partially induced by lower world demand and reﬂect a reduction
Table 1a
Magnitude of gross job ﬂows by sectors from 1992:Q2 to 2014:Q4.
POS NEG NET SUM EXC
Sectors Total Expand Open Total Contract Close
Total Private 7.18 5.71 1.47 6.88 5.52 1.36 0.30 14.06 13.47
Crop Production 25.77 22.26 3.51 25.77 22.27 3.50 0.00 51.54 50.25
Animal Production 7.59 6.15 1.44 7.11 5.98 1.13 0.48 14.69 14.10
Forestry & Logging 11.15 8.20 2.95 11.61 8.42 3.19 −0.47 22.76 21.45
Hunting, Fishing & Trapping 22.36 11.59 10.76 22.60 11.79 10.81 −0.25 44.96 41.79
Support Act. for Agr. For. 30.18 24.09 6.09 29.96 24.40 5.56 0.21 60.14 57.12
Oil & Gas Extraction 4.76 3.76 1.00 4.54 3.54 1.00 0.21 9.30 8.00
Mining (except Oil & Gas) 5.58 4.77 0.81 5.91 4.97 0.94 −0.33 11.49 10.46
Support Act. for Mining 8.63 7.15 1.48 7.46 5.99 1.46 1.17 16.09 13.21
Utilities 2.56 2.11 0.45 2.81 2.41 0.39 −0.25 5.36 4.90
Construction of Buildings 12.76 9.54 3.22 12.58 9.46 3.12 0.18 25.34 24.09
Heavy & Civil Eng. Construction 12.99 11.09 1.90 12.79 10.99 1.80 0.20 25.78 24.45
Specialty Trade Contractors 12.38 9.81 2.57 12.04 9.49 2.55 0.34 24.42 23.06
Food Manuf. 5.48 4.90 0.58 5.51 4.87 0.64 −0.03 10.99 10.62
Beverage & Tobacco Manuf. 5.42 4.78 0.64 5.28 4.66 0.62 0.14 10.70 9.81
Textile Mills 3.44 3.02 0.43 4.96 4.29 0.67 −1.52 8.40 6.74
Textile Product Mills 5.34 4.61 0.72 6.09 5.15 0.94 −0.75 11.43 10.33
Apparel Manuf. 6.73 5.26 1.47 8.77 6.51 2.26 −2.04 15.50 13.39
Leather & Allied Product Manuf. 4.60 4.04 0.55 5.85 5.07 0.78 −1.25 10.45 8.85
Wood Product Manuf. 5.31 4.66 0.65 5.66 4.86 0.80 −0.35 10.97 9.66
Paper Manuf. 2.83 2.51 0.32 3.40 2.96 0.44 −0.57 6.23 5.55
Printing & Related Support Act. 4.41 3.75 0.66 5.12 4.16 0.96 −0.71 9.54 8.70
Petroleum & Coal Manuf. 4.03 3.45 0.57 4.25 3.59 0.66 −0.22 8.28 7.36
Chemical Manuf. 2.96 2.52 0.44 3.17 2.73 0.45 −0.22 6.13 5.70
Plastics & Rubber Manuf. 3.94 3.55 0.39 4.13 3.62 0.50 −0.19 8.06 7.20
Nonmetallic Mineral Manuf. 5.09 4.45 0.64 5.38 4.69 0.69 −0.29 10.48 9.54
Primary Metal Manuf. 2.97 2.68 0.28 3.49 3.13 0.36 −0.52 6.46 5.38
Fabricated Metal Manuf. 4.64 4.11 0.53 4.69 4.08 0.61 −0.04 9.33 8.39
Machinery Manuf. 3.84 3.43 0.41 4.01 3.50 0.51 −0.17 7.84 6.85
Computer & Electronic Manuf. 3.26 2.77 0.49 3.77 3.20 0.56 −0.51 7.03 6.01
Electrical Equipment Manuf. 3.27 2.92 0.35 3.74 3.28 0.46 −0.47 7.01 6.18
Transp. Equipment Manuf. 3.44 3.11 0.32 3.74 3.37 0.37 −0.30 7.17 6.08
Furniture Product Manuf. 4.95 4.29 0.66 5.54 4.59 0.94 −0.58 10.49 9.31
Miscellaneous Manuf. 4.66 3.95 0.71 4.87 4.02 0.85 −0.21 9.53 9.01
Wholesalers, Durables 5.35 4.36 0.99 5.15 4.06 1.09 0.20 10.51 9.80
Wholesalers, Nondurables 5.70 4.76 0.94 5.56 4.50 1.07 0.14 11.27 10.84
Wholesale Electronic Markets 8.16 5.59 2.56 7.93 5.20 2.74 0.22 16.09 15.21
Motor Vehicle & Parts Dealers 5.17 4.34 0.84 4.89 4.04 0.85 0.28 10.06 9.33
Furniture Stores 7.74 6.24 1.49 7.66 6.17 1.49 0.08 15.40 14.29
Electronics & Appliance Stores 8.22 6.56 1.66 7.91 6.24 1.67 0.31 16.13 14.75
Building Mat. & Garden Equip. 6.55 5.51 1.05 6.11 5.23 0.88 0.44 12.67 11.43
Food & Beverage Stores 5.36 4.16 1.20 5.23 4.28 0.95 0.13 10.60 10.22
Health & Personal Care Stores 6.88 5.63 1.25 6.54 5.47 1.07 0.33 13.42 12.68
Notes: Expand, Open, Contract and Close stand for expanding, opening, contracting and closing establishments, respectively.
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Table 1b
Magnitude of gross job ﬂows by sectors from 1992:Q2 to 2014:Q4.
POS NEG NET SUM EXC
Sectors Total Expand Open Total Contract Close
Gasoline Stations 7.56 6.06 1.50 7.66 6.11 1.55 −0.10 15.22 14.74
Clothing & Accessories Stores 10.47 8.76 1.71 10.30 8.73 1.57 0.17 20.77 19.91
Sport, Hobby, Music & Books 11.01 9.23 1.78 10.84 9.16 1.68 0.16 21.85 20.93
General Merchandise Stores 6.23 5.47 0.76 5.95 5.52 0.43 0.28 12.18 11.01
Miscellaneous Store Retailers 9.74 7.49 2.25 9.56 7.44 2.12 0.18 19.30 18.32
Nonstore Retailers 8.29 7.00 1.29 8.22 6.79 1.43 0.07 16.51 15.49
Air Transp. 2.74 2.40 0.34 2.82 2.52 0.30 −0.08 5.55 4.46
Water Transp. 6.29 5.42 0.86 6.42 5.51 0.90 −0.13 12.70 11.52
Truck Transp. 7.05 5.59 1.45 6.83 5.23 1.60 0.22 13.88 13.06
Transit & Ground Pass. Transp. 7.19 5.91 1.28 6.78 5.33 1.45 0.41 13.97 13.17
Pipeline Transp. 3.87 3.06 0.81 4.17 3.27 0.90 −0.30 8.04 6.97
Scenic & Sightseeing Transp. 18.01 13.72 4.29 17.63 13.67 3.96 0.38 35.63 30.74
Support Act. for Transp. 7.35 5.95 1.41 6.88 5.49 1.39 0.47 14.24 13.32
Couriers & Messengers 6.04 5.46 0.58 5.51 4.92 0.59 0.53 11.55 9.43
Warehousing & Storage 5.49 4.79 0.71 5.17 4.51 0.65 0.33 10.66 9.84
Publishing Industries (no Internet) 3.88 3.18 0.70 4.08 3.27 0.82 −0.21 7.96 7.26
Movie Picture & Sound Industries 11.51 9.01 2.50 11.38 8.90 2.47 0.13 22.89 20.69
Broadcasting (no Internet) 4.64 3.68 0.96 4.53 3.52 1.01 0.11 9.17 8.60
Telecommunications 5.05 3.99 1.06 5.17 4.14 1.04 −0.12 10.23 9.15
Data Proc., Host. & Related Serv. 6.33 4.95 1.39 5.85 4.40 1.45 0.48 12.18 10.73
Other Information Serv. 6.60 5.07 1.53 5.29 3.95 1.34 1.31 11.89 9.76
Credit Intermed. & Related Act. 5.07 4.04 1.02 5.01 3.89 1.12 0.06 10.08 9.45
Financial Investments 5.50 4.06 1.44 4.94 3.56 1.38 0.56 10.44 9.36
Insurance Carriers & Related Act. 4.65 3.62 1.04 4.53 3.45 1.08 0.12 9.18 8.82
Funds, Trusts & Other Finan. Veh. 6.58 3.81 2.77 6.08 3.52 2.55 0.50 12.65 11.23
Real Estate 7.99 5.70 2.29 7.73 5.45 2.28 0.26 15.71 15.20
Rental & Leasing Serv. 7.89 6.27 1.62 7.80 6.08 1.72 0.09 15.70 14.71
Lessors 7.09 5.43 1.66 6.57 4.89 1.69 0.51 13.66 12.23
Profess., Scient. & Tech. Serv. 7.83 5.87 1.96 7.25 5.31 1.94 0.59 15.08 14.21
Management of Comp. & Enterp. 4.05 3.49 0.55 3.94 3.44 0.50 0.11 7.98 7.50
Administrative & Support Serv. 10.65 8.74 1.91 9.87 8.03 1.83 0.78 20.51 19.14
Waste Manag. & Remed. Serv. 7.56 6.04 1.53 7.39 5.76 1.63 0.18 14.95 14.36
Educational Serv. 7.16 6.17 0.99 6.44 5.54 0.90 0.72 13.60 12.83
Ambulatory Health Care Serv. 6.13 4.90 1.24 5.41 4.18 1.23 0.73 11.54 10.81
Hospitals 1.91 1.61 0.31 1.55 1.31 0.24 0.36 3.47 3.08
Nursing & Resid. Care Facilities 4.04 3.37 0.67 3.60 2.96 0.65 0.44 7.64 7.16
Social Assistance 7.36 5.75 1.61 6.35 5.04 1.31 1.02 13.71 12.69
Perform. Arts & Spectator Sports 19.23 15.68 3.55 18.95 15.33 3.61 0.28 38.18 37.05
Museums, Historical Sites & Sim. 8.00 7.22 0.77 7.32 6.70 0.62 0.68 15.31 14.28
Amus., Gambling & Recreation 14.62 12.07 2.55 14.09 11.77 2.32 0.53 28.71 27.07
Accommodation 7.41 5.94 1.47 7.31 5.95 1.36 0.10 14.72 13.99
Food Serv. & Drinking Places 8.95 6.36 2.59 8.48 6.59 1.90 0.46 17.43 16.83
Repair & Maintenance 8.21 6.17 2.03 8.05 6.01 2.03 0.16 16.25 15.67
Personal & Laundry Serv. 7.78 5.85 1.93 7.65 5.74 1.91 0.14 15.43 15.04
Religious, Grant, Civic, Profes. 8.17 6.93 1.24 7.77 6.58 1.20 0.40 15.94 15.32
Notes: Expand, Open, Contract and Close stand for expanding, opening, contracting and closing establishments, respectively.
in the job reallocation above and beyond the amount required to
accommodate the net employment decrease experienced during
the great recession. A similar, but considerably muted, increase
(decrease) in gross (excess) job reallocation is observed during the
oil price decline observed in the last half of 2014. Now, whether
unexpected declines in oil prices lead to a more intense process
of reallocation in this age of low labor market ﬂuidity is an open
question.
3. Empirical strategy
To study the effect of oil price shock on job ﬂows, we use a
factor augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) model along the
lines of Bernanke et al. (2005) and Boivin et al. (2009). Traditionally,
empirical studies investigating the effects of oil price shocks on
the macroeconomy have employed VAR models using a limited
number of variables. For instance, Herrera and Karaki (2015) esti-
mate, for each of the industries, a simultaneous equation model that
includes the real oil price change and the industry’s job creation and
destruction rates. Instead, we employ a FAVAR model that allows us
to expand the econometrician information set (Forni and Gambetti,
2011, see) and enables us to consider the effect of common unob-
served industrial factors on the aggregate variables. The FAVAR
model assumes that the dynamics of the large panel of industry-level
job ﬂows are captured by some observed and unobserved common
factors. The unobserved factors are extracted from a large set of
industry-level data from the BED (i.e., job creation and destruction
rates for the 3 digit NAICS industry groups).
We formalize the model by assuming that the behavior of
the U.S. economy can be captured by a vector of observable variables
(Yt) and unobservable factors (Ft). The vector Yt consists of the
log growth of real oil price (ot), the total private gross job destruc-
tion rate (TNEGt), the total private job creation rate (TPOSt), and
the quality spread (it). The model has a VAR representation given by
[
Yt
Ft
]
= A(L)
[
Yt−1
Ft−1
]
+ et (6)
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Fig. 1. Oil prices and job ﬂows.
where Yt is a 4×1 vector of observed aggregate variables; Ft
is a vector of k × 1 unobserved factors; A(L) is the matrix of
lag polynomials of order p = 43; and et is a 4×1 vector of
innovations.
Eq. (6) cannot be estimatedwithout knowledge of the unobserved
factors, Ft. Thus, before we estimate Eq. (6) we need to extract the
unobserved factors from a vector Xt, which consists of 174 series
of job creation and destruction rates in eighty seven 3 digit NAICS
3 Hamilton and Herrera (2004) discuss the importance of including enough lags to
capture the sluggish response of U.S. economic activity to oil price shocks. Therefore
we opt for including 4 quarters of lags in the FAVAR.
industries (see Tables A.1a and A.1b of the appendix for a detailed list
of the variables in Xt). The observation equation for the system can
be written as
Xt = KyYt + Kf Ft + ut. (7)
Where Ky is a N× 4 matrix of coeﬃcients on the observable vari-
ables, K f is a N×k matrix of factor loadings, and ut is a vector of
series-speciﬁc components that are uncorrelated with the Yt and Ft.
Note that the model considered in this paper is similar to Davis
and Haltiwanger (2001) in that the same variables are included in
the aggregate block. Nevertheless, an important difference in the
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Fig. 2. Responses of job creation and job destruction to a negative oil price shock of 1 s.d.
speciﬁcation is that while Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) assume that
neither contemporaneous nor lagged industry-level job ﬂows have
an effect on the aggregate block, here the unobserved factors allow
for a lagged effect of the common industry factors. Another impor-
tant difference is that we do not include the absolute value of the oil
price change. This modeling choice stems from work by Herrera et
al. (2011) and Herrera and Karaki (2015) who ﬁnd no evidence of an
asymmetric response of U.S. manufacturing production and job ﬂows
to oil price increases and decreases.
We estimate the FAVAR model using the two step principal com-
ponents approach proposed by Bernanke et al. (2005). However,
before we proceed to the estimation we have to determine the
number of unobserved factors. We assume that the factors are
unknown but remain constant over time and then use Bai and Ng
(2002) ICp2 information criteria to determine the number of factors.
The information criteria leads us to select a total of 7 factors that
drive the job ﬂows dynamics of the U.S. economy. The seven factors
can be categorized as 4 observed factors (Yt) and k= 3 unobserved
common factors.
Having determined the number of factors we then extract three
unobserved factors from a large data set of industrial level variables,
Xt. The estimated factors are represented by Fˆt = [ f1,t, f2,t, f3,t ] and
can be interpreted as industry speciﬁc common factors that are not
captured by the four observed variables in Yt.
We then add the estimated factors Fˆt to the four observed
variables (i.e., ot, TNEGt, TPOSt, it) in order to estimate the VAR
model in Eq. (6). Once we have estimated the state-space sys-
tem in Eqs. (6)-(7), we employ the standard Cholesky decom-
position method to identify the response of the aggregate and
industry-level variables to a 1% decrease in the real oil price.4
Note that our identiﬁcation structure implies that neither aggre-
gate job ﬂows nor the quality spread have a contemporane-
ous effect on real oil price. This assumption is consistent with
work by Kilian and Vega (2011), which suggests that aggre-
gate output and employment do not affect oil prices con-
temporaneously. The assumption that job destruction is Wold-
causally prior to job creation is plausible given the staggering of
labor contracts. Point-wise conﬁdence intervals for the impulse
response functions are computed using a residual based wild
bootstrap method (see Gonçalves and Kilian (2004) and Yamamoto
(2012)).
4. The effects of oil prices job ﬂows
Fig. 2 plots the responses of job creation and job destruction to
an unexpected negative oil price innovation of 1 standard deviation.
Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5%, 10% and 32% is denoted by squares,
diamonds and circles, respectively. Note that the ﬁgures report
impulse responses measured in percentage points. To conserve
space, we depict the impulse response functions for the total pri-
vate sector and twenty three of the eighty seven 3-digit NAICS
4 Once the FAVAR has been estimated and the oil price shocks have been identiﬁed,
we compute the impulse response functions, IRFs for the observed, Yt , and unobserved,
Ft , common factors in (6) in the usual manner. Then, we multiply these IRFs by the
estimated factor loadings in (7) to obtain the impulse response functions for the
sectoral job ﬂows.
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Table 2a
Cumulative change in job ﬂows due to a 1 s.d. negative oil price shock.
POS NEG NET SUM EXC
Sectors 1 year 2 years 1 year 2 years 1 year 2 years 1 year 2 years 1 year 2 years
Total Private −0.021 0.092 0.161 0.034 −0.183 0.058 0.140 0.127 −0.162 −0.416
Crop Production 0.387 0.666 0.384 0.521 0.003 0.145 0.772 1.187 0.034 0.307
Animal Production 0.010 0.098 0.098 0.078 −0.088 0.020 0.108 0.176 −0.114 −0.154
Forestry & Logging 0.230 0.368 0.263 0.125 −0.033 0.243 0.493 0.494 −0.318 −0.593
Hunting, Fishing & Trapping −0.082 0.262 −0.270 −0.109 0.187 0.371 −0.352 0.153 −1.865 −1.543
Support Act. for Agr. For. 0.454 0.828 0.410 0.448 0.044 0.380 0.864 1.276 −0.187 −0.143
Oil & Gas Extraction −0.246 −0.228 −0.070 −0.055 −0.175 −0.172 −0.316 −0.283 −0.937 −0.939
Mining (except Oil & Gas) 0.119 0.177 0.335 0.207 −0.216 −0.030 0.454 0.383 −0.472 −0.729
Support Act. for Mining −0.305 0.032 0.614 0.319 −0.919 −0.287 0.308 0.351 −2.428 −3.018
Utilities −0.058 −0.123 0.035 0.012 −0.093 −0.135 −0.024 −0.110 −0.132 −0.261
Construction of Buildings 0.128 0.517 0.275 0.194 −0.147 0.323 0.403 0.712 −0.230 −0.392
Heavy & Civil Eng. Construction 0.168 0.476 0.425 0.366 −0.257 0.110 0.592 0.842 −0.320 −0.438
Specialty Trade Contractors 0.136 0.490 0.277 0.156 −0.140 0.334 0.413 0.647 −0.108 −0.349
Food Manuf. 0.092 0.198 0.076 0.112 0.016 0.086 0.169 0.310 0.089 0.160
Beverage & Tobacco Manuf. 0.094 0.184 0.002 0.011 0.092 0.173 0.095 0.196 −0.270 −0.361
Textile Mills −0.135 −0.057 0.360 −0.146 −0.494 0.089 0.225 −0.203 −0.581 −1.592
Textile Product Mills −0.116 0.057 0.267 −0.007 −0.383 0.064 0.151 0.051 −0.513 −1.060
Apparel Manuf. −0.236 −0.126 0.419 −0.017 −0.655 −0.109 0.183 −0.143 −0.696 −1.568
Leather & Allied Product Manuf. −0.045 0.086 0.416 0.096 −0.461 −0.010 0.371 0.181 −0.297 −0.938
Wood Product Manuf. 0.100 0.272 0.239 −0.149 −0.139 0.421 0.338 0.122 −0.264 −1.040
Paper Manuf. −0.026 0.035 0.202 0.029 −0.228 0.006 0.176 0.063 −0.174 −0.521
Printing & Related Support Act. −0.048 0.109 0.280 0.075 −0.328 0.035 0.232 0.184 −0.266 −0.677
Petroleum & Coal Manuf. 0.057 0.016 0.079 0.035 −0.022 −0.018 0.136 0.051 −0.169 −0.291
Chemical Manuf. 0.014 0.065 0.218 0.095 −0.203 −0.030 0.232 0.160 −0.057 −0.303
Plastics & Rubber Manuf. −0.068 0.106 0.385 0.069 −0.454 0.038 0.317 0.175 −0.411 −1.044
Nonmetallic Mineral Manuf. −0.001 0.156 0.233 −0.058 −0.234 0.214 0.233 0.099 −0.251 −0.833
Primary Metal Manuf. −0.188 −0.059 0.719 0.170 −0.907 −0.228 0.531 0.111 −0.926 −2.024
Fabricated Metal Manuf. −0.158 0.039 0.538 0.148 −0.696 −0.109 0.381 0.187 −0.657 −1.439
Machinery Manuf. −0.154 0.020 0.551 0.139 −0.705 −0.119 0.398 0.159 −0.868 −1.692
Computer & Electronic Manuf. −0.186 −0.047 0.536 0.207 −0.722 −0.254 0.350 0.161 −0.553 −1.210
Electrical Equipment Manuf. −0.145 0.006 0.526 0.168 −0.671 −0.162 0.381 0.173 −0.509 −1.225
Transp. Equipment Manuf. −0.110 0.020 0.401 0.031 −0.510 −0.011 0.291 0.050 −0.543 −1.283
Furniture Product Manuf. 0.014 0.208 0.412 0.045 −0.398 0.164 0.425 0.253 −0.290 −1.024
Miscellaneous Manuf. −0.038 0.099 0.186 0.050 −0.224 0.049 0.149 0.149 −0.262 −0.535
Wholesalers, Durables −0.091 0.054 0.291 0.100 −0.382 −0.046 0.200 0.154 −0.348 −0.729
Wholesalers, Nondurables 0.032 0.133 0.116 0.052 −0.084 0.080 0.148 0.185 −0.006 −0.134
Wholesale Electronic Markets −0.108 −0.082 0.138 0.029 −0.246 −0.111 0.030 −0.053 −0.304 −0.523
Motor Vehicle & Parts Dealers 0.009 0.109 0.152 −0.032 −0.143 0.140 0.161 0.077 −0.266 −0.634
Furniture Stores −0.055 0.096 0.189 −0.075 −0.244 0.171 0.135 0.021 −0.428 −0.957
Electronics & Appliance Stores −0.318 −0.161 0.351 0.129 −0.669 −0.291 0.033 −0.032 −0.866 −1.309
Building Mat. & Garden Equip. 0.152 0.303 0.018 −0.064 0.134 0.367 0.170 0.238 −0.377 −0.541
Food & Beverage Stores −0.047 0.033 −0.001 −0.029 −0.046 0.062 −0.047 0.004 −0.127 −0.184
Health & Personal Care Stores −0.146 −0.077 0.004 −0.037 −0.150 −0.041 −0.143 −0.114 −0.358 −0.439
industries. These responses correspond to industries that are energy
intensive in production or consumption, represent a large proportion
of employment, or have been identiﬁed by other studies as industries
that are likely to respond to changes in gasoline prices (Edelstein
and Kilian, 2007, 2009; Ramey and Vine, 2010). The responses for
the remaining industries are reported in the online appendix (see
Figures A.1a-A.1c).5
4.1. The response job ﬂows in the private sector
We ﬁrst examine the effect of an unexpected decrease in real oil
prices on the job creation and destruction rates for the total private
sector. The top panel of Fig. 2 shows that job destruction is more
responsive than job creation. For instance at h = 2, the response
of job destruction is twice as large as the response of job creation.
Notice that one year after the shock the economy experiences a
decrease in job destruction and an increase in job creation that
results in a net increase in the employment generated by the private
sector.
To get a more complete view of the impact such decrease in oil
prices would have on total private job ﬂows, we report the 1-year
5 The online appendix is available at http://gatton.uky.edu/faculty/herrera/
documents/HKRappendix.pdf
and 2-year cumulative effects on job creation, job destruction, net
employment change, gross job reallocation and excess job realloca-
tion in Tables 2a and 2b. The cumulative responses are measured
in percentage points. The ﬁrst row of Table 2a reveals that the
1-year and 2-year cumulative effects associated with a negative
oil price shock on job creation (job destruction) are −0.021(0.161)
and 0.092 (0.034) percentage points, respectively. Furthermore, the
1-year cumulative effect on net employment change, NET, is −0.183
percentage points, which seems economically signiﬁcant since NET
averaged 0.3% during our sample period. In other words, a year after
the unexpected oil price decrease net employment growth decreases
to about 0.12%. As for the effect of a decline in oil prices on job
reallocation, the 1-year cumulative effect on gross job reallocation
(excess job reallocation) equals 0.140 (−0.162) percentage points.
These results suggest that a decline in oil prices increases the pace of
gross job reallocation in the U.S. economy but decreases the reallo-
cation above and beyond what is required to accommodate the net
employment change. In other words, an unexpected decrease in oil
prices leads to a reduction in labor market ﬂuidity.
4.2. Dynamic responses at the industry level
Where do jobs go when oil prices fall? Previous studies have
found the response of U.S. manufacturing employment to exhibit
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Table 2b
Cumulative change in job ﬂows due to a 1 s.d. negative oil price shock.
POS NEG NET SUM EXC
Sectors 1 year 2 years 1 year 2 years 1 year 2 years 1 year 2 years 1 year 2 years
Gasoline Stations 0.027 0.110 −0.016 −0.072 0.043 0.182 0.010 0.038 −0.128 −0.240
Clothing & Accessories Stores −0.180 0.014 0.169 0.144 −0.349 −0.130 −0.011 0.158 −0.509 −0.559
Sport, Hobby, Music & Books −0.123 0.122 0.208 0.151 −0.331 −0.029 0.085 0.273 −0.366 −0.480
General Merchandise Stores 0.051 0.148 0.134 0.079 −0.083 0.069 0.186 0.227 0.001 −0.110
Miscellaneous Store Retailers −0.072 0.124 0.041 −0.040 −0.113 0.164 −0.031 0.084 −0.488 −0.650
Nonstore Retailers −0.255 −0.066 0.337 0.157 −0.592 −0.223 0.082 0.092 −0.635 −0.995
Air Transp. −0.100 0.023 0.632 0.367 −0.732 −0.344 0.532 0.390 −0.317 −0.846
Water Transp. −0.099 0.017 0.195 0.100 −0.294 −0.083 0.096 0.117 −0.401 −0.591
Truck Transp. 0.059 0.218 0.263 0.062 −0.204 0.156 0.323 0.280 −0.169 −0.571
Transit & Ground Pass. Transp. 0.088 0.119 0.371 0.293 −0.284 −0.174 0.459 0.412 0.122 −0.063
Pipeline Transp. −0.033 −0.147 0.316 0.167 −0.349 −0.314 0.283 0.020 −0.163 −0.491
Scenic & Sightseeing Transp. 0.965 1.204 −0.478 −0.507 1.443 1.711 0.487 0.697 −1.461 −2.285
Support Act. for Transp. −0.022 0.168 0.405 0.229 −0.426 −0.061 0.383 0.396 −0.306 −0.659
Couriers & Messengers −0.153 0.139 0.561 0.271 −0.714 −0.132 0.409 0.410 −0.763 −1.344
Warehousing & Storage −0.033 0.138 0.249 0.133 −0.281 0.006 0.216 0.271 −0.376 −0.607
Publishing Industries (no Internet) −0.072 0.035 0.293 0.101 −0.365 −0.067 0.221 0.136 −0.283 −0.666
Movie Picture & Sound Industries 0.108 0.426 −0.092 −0.092 0.200 0.518 0.016 0.334 −0.575 −0.591
Broadcasting (no Internet) −0.115 −0.003 0.174 0.110 −0.289 −0.113 0.059 0.107 −0.308 −0.436
Telecommunications −0.183 −0.192 0.368 0.072 −0.551 −0.264 0.184 −0.120 −0.432 −1.023
Data Proc., Host. & Related Serv. −0.498 −0.308 0.616 0.237 −1.114 −0.545 0.118 −0.072 −1.173 −1.933
Other Information Serv. −0.744 −0.596 0.701 0.197 −1.445 −0.793 −0.042 −0.399 −1.666 −2.675
Credit Intermed. & Related Act. 0.102 0.059 −0.194 −0.228 0.296 0.286 −0.092 −0.169 −0.388 −0.479
Financial Investments −0.139 −0.051 0.414 0.131 −0.552 −0.182 0.275 0.080 −0.429 −0.994
Insurance Carriers & Related Act. −0.004 0.019 −0.003 −0.032 0.000 0.051 −0.007 −0.013 −0.137 −0.195
Funds, Trusts & Other Finan. Veh. 0.761 1.019 0.820 0.899 −0.060 0.119 1.581 1.918 1.173 1.303
Real Estate −0.025 0.068 −0.064 −0.071 0.039 0.139 −0.088 −0.003 −0.240 −0.254
Rental & Leasing Serv. 0.041 0.259 0.112 0.013 −0.071 0.246 0.152 0.272 −0.146 −0.343
Lessors −0.193 −0.023 0.127 0.074 −0.320 −0.097 −0.066 0.051 −0.768 −0.873
Profess., Scient. & Tech. Serv. −0.203 −0.068 0.251 0.106 −0.454 −0.173 0.048 0.038 −0.533 −0.824
Management of Comp. & Enterp. −0.025 0.067 0.174 0.062 −0.199 0.005 0.148 0.129 −0.148 −0.372
Administrative & Support Serv. 0.158 0.377 0.474 0.172 −0.315 0.205 0.632 0.549 −0.016 −0.618
Waste Manag. & Remed. Serv. 0.065 0.201 0.142 0.127 −0.077 0.074 0.208 0.329 −0.014 −0.043
Educational Serv. −0.035 −0.047 0.060 0.035 −0.095 −0.082 0.025 −0.012 −0.243 −0.306
Ambulatory Health Care Serv. 0.027 0.079 −0.084 −0.050 0.111 0.128 −0.058 0.029 −0.169 −0.111
Hospitals 0.005 0.012 0.012 0.057 −0.007 −0.045 0.017 0.070 −0.078 −0.064
Nursing & Resid. Care Facilities 0.087 0.072 −0.018 −0.019 0.105 0.091 0.069 0.053 −0.042 −0.080
Social Assistance 0.171 0.287 0.028 0.040 0.143 0.247 0.199 0.326 −0.013 −0.074
Perform. Arts & Spectator Sports −0.259 −0.161 −0.016 −0.073 −0.243 −0.088 −0.276 −0.233 −0.594 −0.707
Museums, Historical Sites & Sim. −0.031 0.147 0.085 0.039 −0.116 0.109 0.054 0.186 −0.188 −0.280
Amus., Gambling & Recreation 0.276 0.551 0.058 −0.044 0.218 0.596 0.334 0.507 −0.248 −0.460
Accommodation −0.066 0.101 0.277 0.112 −0.343 −0.011 0.212 0.213 −0.261 −0.591
Food Serv. & Drinking Places 0.042 0.157 0.037 0.016 0.005 0.140 0.078 0.173 −0.069 −0.109
Repair & Maintenance −0.031 0.094 0.097 −0.007 −0.128 0.101 0.065 0.087 −0.214 −0.421
Personal & Laundry Serv. −0.079 0.007 0.021 −0.011 −0.100 0.018 −0.058 −0.005 −0.201 −0.267
Religious, Grant, Civic, Profes. 0.023 0.076 0.078 0.048 −0.055 0.028 0.101 0.124 −0.080 −0.165
considerable heterogeneity across industries. In particular, indus-
tries that are intensive in the use of energy either in production (e.g.,
rubber and plastics) or consumption (e.g., transportation equipment)
tend to be more responsive to oil price shocks. Hence, one would
expect a decline in oil prices to induce jobs to shift from less energy
intensive to more energy intensive manufacturing industries. But,
how do job ﬂows in other sectors such as mining, construction and
services respond to an oil shock? Answering this question is crucial
to understanding how oil price movements may induce changes in
the pace of job reallocation, especially since manufacturing accounts
only for 12% of private sector employment.
Fig. 2 (as well as Figures A.1a-A.1c of the online appendix) show
important heterogeneity in the responses of job creation and job
destruction across sectors.6 Consider ﬁrst the dynamic response
of agriculture and forestry, Fig. 2 depicts job ﬂows responses that
greatly differ across industries. For instance four quarters after the
6 For the sake of brevity we only report the responses of 23 of the 87 industries in
the paper. The responses for the remaining industries can be found in Figures A.1a-
A.1c of the online appendix.
shock, the responses of job creation and destruction are almost
identical for crop production and hunting, ﬁshing and trapping;
yet, they diverge for animal production, and forestry and logging.
Tables 2a and 2b indicate that the quantitative effect of an unex-
pected oil price shock on net employment growth is smaller for
industries in this sector of the economy. Similarly, the effect on util-
ities is moderate, although a statistically signiﬁcant decline in job
creation is observed around three quarters after the shock.
Let us now shift our attention to the industries in the construction
and mining sectors. Fig. 2 reveals that for the oil and gas industry,
a negative oil price shock has no signiﬁcant effect on job destruc-
tion, but job creation falls sharply at low horizons and then starts to
increase two quarters after the shock. As for the support activities
for mining, a negative oil price shock triggers a decrease (increase)
in job creation (job destruction) for h < 2. Starting h = 2, job cre-
ation (destruction) starts to increase (decrease). This result indicates
that in the short-run, the net employment change for these indus-
tries decreases importantly. Moreover, Table 2a shows evidence of a
reduction in excess job reallocation following an unexpected decline
in oil prices. For instance, the 1-year (2-year) cumulative change
in excess job reallocation rate equals −0.472 (−0.729) and −0.230
(−0.392) percentage points for mining (except oil and gas) and
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Table 3a
Cumulative change in job ﬂows due to a 1 s.d. negative oil price shock.
POS expanding POS opening NEG contracting NEG closing
Sectors 1 year 2 years 1 year 2 years 1 year 2 years 1 year 2 years
Total Private −0.046 0.054 0.070 0.100 0.054 −0.125 0.091 0.076
Crop Production −0.118 −0.165 0.170 0.217 −0.113 −0.300 0.049 0.028
Animal Production −0.005 0.012 0.070 0.100 −0.010 −0.101 0.086 0.094
Forestry & Logging 0.033 0.070 0.097 0.092 0.038 −0.187 0.041 −0.053
Hunting, Fishing & Trapping −0.076 0.072 0.076 0.246 0.046 −0.005 −0.546 −0.615
Support Act. for Agr. For. −0.573 −0.603 0.194 0.214 0.426 0.349 0.115 0.073
Oil & Gas Extraction 0.033 0.081 0.079 0.113 0.199 0.252 0.096 0.107
Mining (except Oil & Gas) −0.047 −0.107 0.009 −0.009 −0.187 −0.418 0.005 −0.005
Support Act. for Mining −0.483 −0.306 −0.026 −0.024 0.241 −0.205 −0.020 −0.027
Utilities 0.018 0.018 0.066 0.092 0.081 0.097 0.049 0.078
Construction of Buildings 0.013 0.272 0.036 0.096 −0.102 −0.502 0.027 −0.068
Heavy & Civil Eng. Construction −0.009 0.228 0.047 0.062 0.165 −0.144 0.097 0.055
Specialty Trade Contractors −0.056 0.180 0.008 0.039 −0.029 −0.440 0.060 −0.017
Food Manuf. −0.048 −0.027 0.055 0.074 −0.027 −0.084 0.073 0.087
Beverage & Tobacco Manuf. −0.190 −0.086 0.015 0.008 0.113 0.090 −0.038 −0.043
Textile Mills −0.003 0.073 0.033 0.029 −0.055 −0.596 0.050 −0.001
Textile Product Mills −0.045 0.085 −0.023 −0.024 −0.029 −0.434 0.101 0.086
Apparel Manuf. −0.171 −0.103 −0.004 0.011 0.325 0.013 0.204 0.148
Leather & Allied Product Manuf. −0.166 −0.071 0.044 0.052 0.118 −0.243 0.068 0.065
Wood Product Manuf. 0.091 0.266 0.024 0.026 −0.270 −0.902 0.065 0.017
Paper Manuf. 0.060 0.120 0.034 0.032 0.040 −0.153 0.073 0.077
Printing & Related Support Act. −0.044 0.071 0.030 0.048 0.111 −0.152 0.057 0.047
Petroleum & Coal Manuf. 0.080 0.066 0.277 0.313 −0.148 −0.221 0.349 0.355
Chemical Manuf. 0.034 0.087 0.123 0.147 0.160 0.021 0.098 0.092
Plastics & Rubber Manuf. −0.074 0.053 0.045 0.056 −0.012 −0.451 0.095 0.082
Nonmetallic Mineral Manuf. −0.031 0.160 0.030 0.030 −0.001 −0.463 0.073 0.052
Primary Metal Manuf. −0.063 0.042 0.081 0.080 0.075 −0.526 0.116 0.077
Fabricated Metal Manuf. −0.109 0.044 0.024 0.041 0.162 −0.296 0.059 0.041
Machinery Manuf. −0.144 −0.026 0.044 0.049 0.135 −0.311 0.067 0.052
Computer & Electronic Manuf. −0.237 −0.153 0.143 0.170 0.380 0.079 0.130 0.126
Electrical Equipment Manuf. −0.173 −0.066 0.080 0.085 0.250 −0.128 0.034 0.013
Transp. Equipment Manuf. 0.014 0.098 0.018 0.039 −0.218 −0.849 0.016 0.003
Furniture Product Manuf. 0.007 0.183 0.020 0.030 0.007 −0.583 0.018 −0.031
Miscellaneous Manuf. −0.011 0.088 0.042 0.051 0.015 −0.199 0.051 0.045
Wholesalers, Durables −0.062 0.086 0.079 0.099 0.100 −0.133 0.118 0.110
Wholesalers, Nondurables −0.032 0.049 0.046 0.061 0.035 −0.072 0.057 0.042
Wholesale Electronic Markets −0.070 0.010 0.081 0.079 0.043 −0.098 0.144 0.107
Motor Vehicle & Parts Dealers −0.014 0.097 0.027 0.039 0.067 −0.199 0.050 0.000
Furniture Stores 0.062 0.259 −0.008 −0.002 −0.142 −0.506 −0.013 −0.147
Electronics & Appliance Stores −0.106 0.014 −0.050 −0.069 −0.203 −0.385 0.091 −0.010
Building Mat. & Garden Equip. −0.094 0.086 −0.020 −0.045 −0.019 −0.259 0.049 0.035
Food & Beverage Stores −0.133 −0.101 −0.009 0.008 0.020 −0.029 0.001 0.002
Health & Personal Care Stores −0.123 −0.014 0.069 0.083 0.075 0.020 0.155 0.175
construction of buildings, respectively. Note how the decline in the
excess job reallocation rate persists 2 years after the shock.7
Regarding manufacturing industries, job destruction tends to be
more responsive than job creation, especially for wood manufac-
turing, plastics and rubber products, and transportation equipment
(see Fig. 2). Unlike most manufacturing industries, there is very little
change in the rate at which ﬁrms in petroleum and coal products
create and shed jobs. In addition, in the year following the oil price
drop, signiﬁcant declines in excess job reallocation take place for
20 of the 21 manufacturing industries (see Table 2a). The largest
reductions in the excess job reallocation rate occur in industries
that are energy intensive in production (such as fabricated metals,
primary metal manufacturing, plastics and rubber products manu-
facturing) and in use (such as transportation equipment). Overall
7 In 2014 employment in oil and gas extraction equaled 45,260. Of these
employees 46.9% were directly employed in the oil industry as petroleum engi-
neers, and petroleum pump system operators, reﬁnery operators, and gaugers. The
remaining employees comprised geoscientists, except hydrologists and geographers,
roustabouts and wellhead pumpers who worked in both industries. Hence, it is safe to
assume that more than 50% of the employment in this sector stems from oil extrac-
tion. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that the oil and gas industries might react
differently to oil supply shocks.
our results are consistent with Herrera and Karaki (2015) and Davis
and Haltiwanger (2001) who – using data that ends before the year
2000 – ﬁnd considerable heterogeneity and a stronger job ﬂow
response for energy intensive industries in themanufacturing sector.
Last but not least, we consider the dynamic response of services.
Note how, soon after the shock (h = 1), industries in the service sec-
tor exhibit a stronger response in job destruction than job creation
(see Fig. 2). For instance, by the end of the ﬁrst year the rate at which
ﬁrms in credit intermediation shed jobs has declined 0.194 percent-
age points whereas the job creation rate has increased by 0.102 per-
centage points. As a result, net employment has increased by 0.296
percentage points a year after the shock. Interestingly, Tables 2a and
2b reveal a 1-year cumulative decline in excess job reallocation rate
for 51 out of 54 industries in the service sector. Given that services
represent about 79% of private employment, this result is indicative
of a sizeable effect on job reallocation for the U.S. economy.
To gain additional insight into which sectors experience larger
changes in job ﬂows we computed the Pearson correlation coeﬃ-
cient between the one or two-year cumulative change in job creation
(destruction) and the degree of energy intensity measured by the
production of oil and gas extraction required, both directly and indi-
rectly, to deliver one dollar to ﬁnal use of each industry. To compute
these total requirements we use the 2007 input–output tables
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Table 3b
Cumulative change in job ﬂows due to a 1 s.d. negative oil price shock.
POS expanding POS opening NEG contracting NEG closing
Sectors 1 year 2 years 1 year 2 years 1 year 2 years 1 year 2 years
Gasoline Stations −0.113 −0.062 0.089 0.098 −0.004 −0.074 0.090 0.064
Clothing & Accessories Stores −0.108 0.067 0.002 0.012 −0.064 −0.247 −0.010 −0.029
Sport, Hobby, Music & Books −0.169 −0.042 0.056 0.090 0.181 −0.004 0.024 0.002
General Merchandise Stores −0.437 −0.410 0.064 0.055 0.163 0.010 0.104 0.091
Miscellaneous Store Retailers −0.176 −0.086 0.062 0.086 0.131 0.014 0.060 0.028
Nonstore Retailers −0.242 −0.012 0.042 0.073 0.210 0.011 0.072 0.059
Air Transp. −0.155 −0.039 −0.067 −0.063 0.526 0.243 0.014 0.007
Water Transp. 0.125 0.234 0.151 0.225 0.061 −0.106 0.276 0.325
Truck Transp. −0.020 0.103 0.079 0.098 −0.027 −0.300 0.083 0.033
Transit & Ground Pass. Transp. 0.151 0.134 0.068 0.081 0.146 0.051 0.051 0.054
Pipeline Transp. 0.116 0.127 0.086 0.114 0.263 0.229 0.287 0.328
Scenic & Sightseeing Transp. −0.464 −0.578 0.160 0.086 −0.242 −0.545 0.314 0.363
Support Act. for Transp. −0.092 0.049 0.065 0.074 0.098 −0.166 0.146 0.132
Couriers & Messengers −0.013 0.266 0.041 0.036 0.189 −0.119 0.043 0.019
Warehousing & Storage −0.119 0.034 0.059 0.071 0.020 −0.197 0.075 0.069
Publishing Industries (no Internet) −0.059 0.044 0.029 0.047 0.119 −0.093 0.067 0.061
Movie Picture & Sound Industries −0.350 −0.294 0.152 0.242 0.129 −0.045 0.518 0.603
Broadcasting (no Internet) 0.017 0.140 0.047 0.107 0.177 0.112 0.050 0.077
Telecommunications −0.051 0.050 0.128 0.121 0.314 0.135 0.394 0.378
Data Proc., Host. & Related Serv. −0.326 −0.078 0.043 0.134 0.418 0.213 0.431 0.408
Other Information Serv. −0.710 −0.535 −0.125 −0.044 0.313 −0.010 0.283 0.167
Credit Intermed. & Related Act. 0.292 0.316 0.079 0.094 −0.195 −0.286 0.079 0.051
Financial Investments −0.163 −0.079 0.036 0.033 0.114 −0.178 0.113 0.074
Insurance Carriers & Related Act. 0.185 0.261 0.051 0.083 −0.012 −0.042 0.135 0.142
Funds, Trusts & Other Finan. Veh. 0.120 0.315 0.391 1.146 0.133 0.118 0.586 1.144
Real Estate 0.033 0.102 0.094 0.124 −0.100 −0.220 0.017 −0.006
Rental & Leasing Serv. −0.096 0.051 0.002 0.041 0.082 −0.159 0.088 0.094
Lessors −0.287 −0.236 0.077 0.100 −0.336 −0.454 0.079 0.035
Profess., Scient. & Tech. Serv. −0.061 0.072 0.061 0.114 0.079 −0.090 0.107 0.091
Management of Comp. & Enterp. −0.019 0.060 0.052 0.064 0.119 −0.001 0.043 0.032
Administrative & Support Serv. 0.153 0.353 0.125 0.135 0.275 −0.080 0.158 0.107
Waste Manag. & Remed. Serv. 0.084 0.195 0.222 0.259 0.081 0.013 0.252 0.305
Educational Serv. −0.033 −0.066 0.049 0.065 −0.023 −0.089 0.081 0.100
Ambulatory Health Care Serv. −0.021 −0.011 0.056 0.079 0.073 0.106 0.046 0.076
Hospitals 0.080 0.065 0.033 0.056 −0.032 −0.013 −0.008 0.004
Nursing & Resid. Care Facilities 0.007 −0.022 0.073 0.085 −0.005 0.028 0.088 0.099
Social Assistance −0.015 −0.001 0.536 0.818 −0.026 −0.071 0.062 0.115
Perform. Arts & Spectator Sports 0.081 0.405 0.118 0.165 0.218 0.258 0.120 0.113
Museums, Historical Sites & Sim. −0.244 −0.124 0.088 0.095 0.072 −0.068 0.055 0.045
Amus., Gambling & Recreation −0.333 −0.221 0.075 0.103 0.028 −0.157 0.170 0.135
Accommodation −0.128 −0.012 0.102 0.112 0.189 −0.063 0.103 0.116
Food Serv. & Drinking Places −0.102 −0.047 0.005 −0.001 −0.027 −0.136 0.069 0.046
Repair & Maintenance −0.141 −0.066 0.033 0.053 0.069 −0.081 0.081 0.063
Personal & Laundry Serv. −0.120 −0.065 0.026 0.041 0.021 −0.066 0.036 0.035
Religious, Grant, Civic, Profes. −0.004 0.033 0.091 0.104 0.106 0.043 0.178 0.200
produced by the BEA.8 The results suggest that the more energy
intensive industries are, the larger the increase in job creation, espe-
cially in the long run. The Pearson correlation is negative but insignif-
icant at one year but signiﬁcant at the 10% level at two years. The
correlation between energy intensity and job destruction negative
but statistically insigniﬁcant at both horizons.
Summarizing, we ﬁnd that an unexpected decrease in oil prices
shifts jobs away from oil and gas extraction and support activi-
ties for mining towards industries in construction, manufacturing
and services. In particular, job creation in industries that are energy
intensive tend to experience a larger boom. Moreover, because min-
ing accounts for a small proportion of total employment, the positive
effect on private employment prevails at the aggregate level. As a
result of the change in job ﬂows, excess job reallocation declines in
the private sector and the majority of 3-digit NAICS level industries.
8 2007 represents the ﬁrst year when the industry input-output tables are inte-
grated with the industry account and the national income and product accounts. It is
also the most recent version of the detailed tables.
5. Entry/exit versus existing establishments
The average job creation rate for the U.S. private sector was 7.18%
during the period of analysis, whereas the average job destruction
rate was 6.88%. This high pace of reallocation is mostly driven
by existing ﬁrms. Indeed, the job creation (destruction) rate for
expanding (contracting) ﬁrms averaged 5.71% (5.52%). In contrast,
the job creation rate for entering (exiting) ﬁrms was much lower,
equaling 1.47% (1.36%). Estimation results reported in the previous
section show that the pace of reallocation declines when oil prices
drop. An open question is whether most of the adjustment occurs
through ﬂows from existing or entering and exiting ﬁrms. More pre-
cisely, do changes in job creation (destruction) stem mainly from
the response of expanding (contracting) establishments or opening
(closing) establishments?
To answer this question we modify the model in Eqs. (6)–(7) by
separately including in the vector of industry-level variables Xt the
job destruction rates of contracting and exiting establishments and
the job creation rates of expanding and entering establishments. As
in the previous section, we estimate the FAVAR model using the two
step principal components approach proposed by Bernanke et al.
(2005) and impose the same identiﬁcation restrictions.
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5.1. Job creation: expanding and opening establishments
Is the response of job creation in the private sector driven by the
effect of oil price shocks on expanding or entering ﬁrms? Tables 3a
and 3b show that the 1-year and 2-year cumulative effects associ-
ated with a negative oil price shock on job creation from expanding
(opening) establishments equal −0.046 (0.070) and 0.054 (0.100)
percentage points, respectively. These results suggest that the slight
contractionary effect on private job creation during the ﬁrst year
is driven by expanding establishments. That is, a decline in real oil
prices causes expanding ﬁrms to contract the rate at which they
create jobs. Yet, as time goes by, both existing and entering ﬁrms
create more jobs. This increase in job creation is reﬂected in a
2-year cumulative increase of 0.054 and 0.100 percentage points in
the job creation rate of expanding and opening ﬁrms, respectively.
Additional insight is gained from the impulse response functions,
which for the sake of brevity are plotted in Figures A.2a-A.2d of
the online appendix. These ﬁgures illustrate how job creation from
expanding establishments ismore responsive to oil price shocks than
job creation from opening establishments. For instance, the response
of job creation from expanding establishments declines sharply in
the short run (h < 2) for mining. In contrast, no signiﬁcant changes
are observed in the rate at which opening establishments creates
jobs in these industry.
Let us now focus on the responses of job creation for construc-
tion industries. For construction of buildings, and heavy and civil
engineering construction the responses of job creation from expand-
ing establishments fall for h < 2 and exhibit an important increase
afterwards. In contrast, the responses of job creation from opening
establishments are largelymuted. For instance, the 1-year and 2-year
cumulative changes in the job creation rate from expanding estab-
lishments for heavy and civil engineering construction are −0.009
and 0.228 percentage points whereas the corresponding changes for
opening establishments are 0.047 and 0.062 percentage points.
With respect to the manufacturing industries, Figures A.2a-A.2d
reveal strong heterogeneity in the responses of job creation from
expanding and opening establishments to a negative oil price shock.
For instance for wood manufacturing, there is an important increase
in job creation from expanding establishments and no change in the
response of job creation from opening establishments for h = 3 − 8.
Petroleum and coal products experience a decrease in job creation
for opening establishments and no signiﬁcant change for expanding
establishments. The job creation responses from expanding estab-
lishments for fabricated and primary metals tend to exhibit a drop
for h < 2 and an increase for h = 4 − 8. Moreover, the 1-year and
2-year cumulative change in job creation from expanding (opening)
establishments is positive for 6 (19) and 14 (20) out of 21 manufac-
turing industries (see Table 3a), which suggest a faster response to
the oil price shock for entering than existing establishments.
In the services sector, the job creation responses for expanding
and opening establishments also exhibit heterogeneity. In particular,
the job creation response for opening establishments is considerably
larger for administrative and support services industries than for
other industries in this sector. Yet, whereas for real estate the mag-
nitudes of the responses for opening and expanding establishments
is somewhat similar, the effect of the shock on opening ﬁrms that
provide administrative and support services is stronger for opening
than for expanding ﬁrms in the short run (h < 2). All in all, we ﬁnd
more evidence of an expansionary effect of oil price decreases on the
rate of job creation for opening than expanding service ﬁrms. Note
that the 1-year and 2-year cumulative change in job creation from
expanding (opening) establishments is positive for 14 (48) and 30
(48) out of 54 industries in this sector (see Table 3b).
Summarizing, although we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant degree of hetero-
geneity in the job creation responses of expanding and opening
establishments across industries, there are two noticeable common
features. First, evidence of an increase in job creation is more
widespread for opening ﬁrms in manufacturing and services during
the ﬁrst year. Second, by the second year, increases in job creation are
also apparent for expanding ﬁrms in construction, manufacturing,
and services. In other words, whereas the short-run increase of pri-
vate job creation is mainly explained by opening ﬁrms, at longer
horizons expanding ﬁrms also contribute to private job gains.
5.2. Job destruction: contracting and closing establishments
Table 3a shows that the 1-year and 2-year cumulative effects
associated with a negative oil price shock on job destruction
from contracting (closing) establishments are 0.054 (0.091) and
−0.125(0.076) percentage points, respectively. Figures A.3a-A.3d
of the online appendix illustrate the job destruction responses of
contracting and closing establishments for the total private sector
and twenty three 3-digit NAICS industries. These ﬁgures reveal a
short-run increase in job destruction for contracting establishments
in some industries, whereas the rate for closing establishments
declines. These results suggest that most of the increase in total
private job destruction following an oil price decrease stems from
the response of contracting ﬁrms. Considerable heterogeneity in the
response of job destruction for contracting and closing establish-
ments is observed across industries. However, a common feature is
that reductions in job destruction are more prevalent for contract-
ing than closing establishments. Interestingly for the oil and gas
industry, the response of job destruction from contracting estab-
lishments increases one year after the shock while little change
takes place for closing establishments. Furthermore, in the short-run
(h < 2), job destruction at contracting establishments increases
sharply for mining (except oil and gas) and support activities for
mining. The increase in job destruction experienced during the ﬁrst
year for mining (except oil and gas extraction) is due to job losses
in closing establishments, whereas that in support activities for min-
ing is essentially due to job losses in contracting establishments (see
Table 3a).
Regarding industries in the construction sector, construction of
buildings and heavy and civil engineering construction exhibit a
short run (h < 2) increase in job destruction for contracting estab-
lishments followed by a decline. In comparison, the response of
job destruction from closing establishments is largely muted. For
instance, the 1-year and 2-year cumulative changes in the job
destruction rate from contracting (closing) establishments are 0.165
(0.097) and −0.144(0.055) percentage points for heavy and civil
engineering construction.
Strong heterogeneity in the job destruction responses from con-
tracting and closing establishments is observed in themanufacturing
sector. For instance for wood manufacturing, there is an impor-
tant decrease in job destruction for contracting establishments for
medium to long horizons (h = 3 − 8) and virtually no change in the
response for closing establishments. In contrast, petroleum and coal
exhibit an increase in job destruction for closing establishments and
no signiﬁcant change for contracting establishments. Contracting
establishments in the fabricated metals and primary metals indus-
tries show an increase in the rate at which they shed jobs up to two
quarters after the shock, yet the rate drops afterwards. Over time a
decline in real oil prices leads to reductions in job losses for some
manufacturing industries. Indeed the 1-year and 2-year cumulative
change in job destruction from contracting (closing) establishments
is negative for 8 (1) and 17 (3) out of 21 manufacturing industries.
As for the services sector, the impulse responses show some
differences for contracting and closing establishments across indus-
tries. Compared to other industries in this sector, the increase in the
job destruction rate from closing establishments is larger for funds,
trusts and other ﬁnancial vehicles, whereas contracting establish-
ments shed jobs at a faster rate in the air transportation industry.
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Moreover, we ﬁnd that a year after the decline in the real oil price,
only 16 (3) of the 54 service industries experience a reduction in
the job destruction rate for contracting (closing) establishments. Two
years after the shock, 38 (4) of the 54 service industries experience
a reduction in the job destruction rate from contracting (closing)
establishments.
To summarize, most of the short-run increase in private job
destruction due to an unexpected oil price shock stems from an
increase in job destruction for services. Closing establishments in
this sector react faster to the oil price decline than contracting ﬁrms.
However, as time goes by, existing establishments in all sectors
respond by lowering the rate at which they shed jobs.
6. Historical decomposition
One question that arises in the face of the shale oil boom is what
proportion of the changes in the job creation and destruction rates
stems from oil price shocks. To answer this question we follow a
procedure similar to Kilian and Lee (2014) and ﬁrst compute the
historical decomposition
[
Yˆt
Fˆt
]
≈
t−1∑
i=0
Hˆivˆt−i (8)
where Yˆt and Fˆt denote, respectively, the 4 × 1 and 3 × 1 vectors
of ﬁtted aggregate variables and estimated factors of the FAV AR, Hˆi
denotes the matrix of estimated structural impulse responses at lags
i = 0, 1, 2, ... and vˆt−i is a vector of estimated structural shocks.
Given that we are interested in exploring the contribution of oil
price shocks to the historical variation in job ﬂows, we focus on
the second and third elements of Yˆt ,̂TNEGt and̂TPOSt , which rep-
resent the job destruction and creation rates, respectively. Now, let
TNEGjt (TPOS
j
t) denote the contribution of the structural shock j to the
job creation (destruction) rate in period t. Once we have computed
the historical decomposition, we estimate the cumulative change in
Job destructionJob creation
Notes: 1 = Oil Price Shock; 2 = Total Private Job Destruction Shock; 3 = Total Private Job Creation Shock; 4 = Quality 
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Fig. 3. Contribution to cumulative change in job creation and job destruction.
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the job destruction and creation rates between the dates t and T
due to each of the structural shock j = 1, . . . , 7 aŝTNEG
j
T −̂TNEG
j
t
and̂TPOS
j
T −̂TPOS
j
t , respectively. Note that, in contrast with a V AR,
Eq. (8) of the FAV AR describes the evolution of both the observed, Yˆt ,
and unobserved, Fˆt , common factors as a weighted sum of the esti-
mated structural shocks, vˆt−i. To economize space, and because we
do not attach a structural interpretation to the individual shocks to
the unobserved factors (vˆ5t−i, vˆ
6
t−i, and vˆ
7
t−i), we report the sum of their
contribution to the job creation and destruction rates in Fig. 3.
The ﬁrst row in Fig. 3 illustrates the contribution from the
beginning of the shale oil revolution until the end of the sample,
2004:I-2014:IV. The following rows break this period in two subsam-
ples: 2004:I–2014:II and 2014:II–2014:IV. The second row shows the
result from the beginning of the boom, 2004:I, until the start of the
decline in oil prices, 2014:II. The last row illustrates the contributions
during the period of the oil price decline.
The results for the 2004:I–2014:IV show that during this time
period cumulative oil price shocks accounted only for a very slight
increase in the private job creation rate (0.01 percentage points). In
other words, the slowdown in the rate at which the private sector
created jobs during this period would have been slightly larger in
the absence of unexpected oil price changes. On the other hand, oil
price shocks contributed to a reduction in the rate of job destruc-
tion of 0.07 percentage points. Hence, of the cumulative increase in
the growth rate of net employment (0.5 percentage points) between
2004:I and 2014:IV, 0.08 percentage points are attributed to oil price
shocks.
The second row in Fig. 3, which corresponds to the shale
oil revolution and the Great Surge, reveals that oil price shocks
moderated the decline in the rate of job creation by 0.02 percentage
points and accounted for a 0.08 percentage point decline in the rate
of job destruction. These results suggest, that even during the shale
oil boom, oil price shocks accounted only for a small proportion of
the cumulative change in private net employment.
Finally, the last row shows that oil price shocks lowered the rate
of growth in net employment by 0.04 percentage points between
2014:II and 2014:IV. This cumulative decline is mainly attributed
to an increase of 0.03 percentage points in the rate of job destruc-
tion. In brief, while we ﬁnd that oil price shocks did contribute to
evolution of the job creation and destruction rates – hence to net
employment growth – in the private sector, their contribution was
small relative to other shocks. Our conclusion is that, at least during
this period, other economic fundamentals were the major drivers of
private employment.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we explored the response of job ﬂows to unexpected
oil price declines during an age of reduced labor market ﬂuidity.
Using a FAVAR model, we found that, two years after the shock, an
unexpected decrease in real oil prices has a positive effect on private
employment as the rate of job creation increases more than the rise
in the rate of job destruction. Furthermore, the pace of excess job
reallocation declines.
We then inquired into the dynamics of job ﬂows at the indus-
try level. Our results suggested that the positive effect of a decline
in oil prices is not limited to the manufacturing sector studied by
previous researchers (see Davis and Haltiwanger, 2001, Herrera and
Karaki, 2015). Instead, it extends to the construction and service sec-
tors. These sectors, as well as manufacturing, experience an increase
in the net employment change and a reduction in excess job reallo-
cation. Interestingly, we found that the negative effect of a decline in
oil prices on the mining sector is rather short lived. In particular, a
decrease in job creation and an increase in job destruction that leads
to a reduction in the net employment change are observed for oil and
gas extraction and support activities for mining during the ﬁrst year.
Yet, by the second year, the expansion experienced by other sectors
of the economy appear to drive the demand for goods produced by
these sectors and thus to undo the recessionary impact of the oil
price drop. Our results suggested that, the ﬁrst year after an oil price
decline, jobs ﬂow out frommining towards other sectors of the econ-
omy such as construction, manufacturing and services. The impact
on job ﬂows in agriculture and forestry, instead, is rather small.
Furthermore, we explored whether the effect of an oil price drop
on employment stems from changes in job ﬂows in existing or enter-
ing/exiting ﬁrms. Using a modiﬁed version of the FAVAR we found
that during the ﬁrst year, most of the increase (decrease) in pri-
vate job destruction (creation) stems from changes in job ﬂows from
closing (expanding) ﬁrms in services and manufacturing.
Finally, we inquired into the role of oil price shocks in explaining
the cumulative changes in job ﬂows during the period of the shale oil
boom. We found that oil price shocks explained only a small fraction
of the cumulative change in net employment both during the rapid
shale oil expansion (2004:I–2014:II) and during the oil price collapse
(2014:II–2014:IV).
An interesting question is whether oil supply and oil demand
shocks have a different effect on net employment and job reallo-
cation. Addressing this issue in a convincing manner would require
splicing the earlier 2-digit SIC data with the newer 3-digit NAICS
data so as to cover the 1970s–1980s period where supply driven
shocks dominated the market and the later period where demand
driven shocks gained considerable importance. However, splicing the
data at the sectoral level is not a straightforward task because the
change in classiﬁcation system altered the industries comprised in
each sector. A better alternative, for a researcher with access to the
Census Bureau data, would be to directly match the ﬂows at the
establishment level. We thus leave this question for future research.
To conclude let us return to the question we posed at the begin-
ning of the paper: where do jobs go when oil prices fall? We found
that in the U.S. the pace of job creation declines in oil and gas extrac-
tion, whereas the job creation (destruction) rate declines (increases)
in support activities for mining. Hence, net employment declines in
these industries during the ﬁrst year. In the meantime, jobs ﬂow
to construction, manufacturing and services. Not surprisingly, lower
oil prices have a larger expansionary impact on industries that are
more energy intensive. The response of private net employment in
the ﬁrst year, is essentially explained by the response of expand-
ing and closing ﬁrms in services and manufacturing. All in all, even
though oil production in the U.S. has greatly increased during the
past ﬁve years – mainly due to technological improvements that
allow for extraction from shale formations – the mining sector con-
tinues to represent only a small fraction of private employment.
Hence, although the mining sector contracts employment during the
ﬁrst year, lower oil prices have a beneﬁcial effect on the number of
jobs generated by the U.S. economy by the second year.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2016.02.006.
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